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INTRODUCTION
In late 2017, former Trump Administration National Security
Advisor Michael Flynn pleaded guilty to charges stemming from Special
Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation into whether members of the
Trump campaign colluded with the Russian government in order to
influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election. 2 This has led some in the
mainstream media to suggest that Flynn may, in turn, implicate
individuals at the highest levels of the administration, including Vice
President Mike Pence. 3 Some observers have even speculated that Pence
himself might be indicted. Notably, Harvard constitutional law professor
Laurence Tribe recently tweeted, “Don’t forget Flynn may well have
highly incriminating evidence against VPOTUS Mike Pence . . . And we
know a sitting VP can be indicted and convicted. Recall Agnew.” 4
* J.D. West Virginia University, 2013; M.A., New England College, 2009; B.A., Syracuse University,
2005. Admitted to practice law before the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. The author’s
other works in constitutional law include: Drawing the Line at Atkins and Roper: The Case Against
Additional Categorical Exemptions from Capital Punishment for Offenders with Conditions Affecting
Brain Function, 115 W.VA. L. REV. 1222 (2013) and Penumbras Reconsidered: Interpreting the Bill
of Rights Through Intratextual Analysis with the Third Amendment, 43 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. ___
(2018).
1. Regards to Historian David Kyvig for the term “Age of Impeachment.” See generally
DAVID E. KYVIG, THE AGE OF IMPEACHMENT: AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE SINCE 1960,
132 – 137 (2008). This extremely thorough, well-researched and well-written book expertly
documents the rise of impeachment in American constitutional and political culture during the last
half century.
2. Cristina Maza, If Trump and Pence are Taken Down by Russia Investigation, Here’s Who
the Next President Is, NEWSWEEK (December 1, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/trump-pencepaul-ryan-president-russia-investigation-mike-flynn-728803 [perma.cc/9YQ3-WXPU].
3. Id.
4. Maureen Groppe, What does Flynn’s Guilty Plea Mean for Vice President Pence?, USA
TODAY (December 10, 2017), citing Laurence Tribe (@tribelaw), TWITTER (Dec. 1, 2017, 10:12AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/12/10/what-does-flynns-indictment-mean-vice-
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Professor Tribe’s reference is to Vice President Spiro T. Agnew, whose
well known 1973 conviction for tax evasion coincided with his resignation
of the Vice Presidency. 5
What is less well known is that Agnew’s conviction and resignation
came on the heels of a heated debate over whether a sitting Vice President
is constitutionally immune from indictment and criminal prosecution.6 It
had long been accepted that incumbent Presidents have absolute
constitutional immunity 7 but in 1973 the Justice Department took the
position that sittingVice Presidents are not immune. 8 The Justice
Department maintains that position to this day, 9 but there remains no
judicial resolution to the question of Vice Presidential immunity. 10
With current events suggesting at least the possibility of another Vice
Presidential prosecution, the issue is one warranting further review. In
undertaking that review, this article argues that Vice Presidents are
constitutionally immune from indictment and criminal prosecution while
in office. In Part I of this article, I provide the historical background for
this issue with a brief discussion of the influential Agnew case. In Part II,
I closely examine the constitutional arguments presented in that case—
both for and against Vice Presidential immunity. Finally, in Part III, I
challenge the Agnew precedent and argue that the Constitution does
provide for absolute Vice Presidential immunity, citing constitutional
considerations overlooked in 1973.

president-pence/935678001/ [https://perma.cc/BJ4G-QKFL]. Contrary to Professor Tribe’s assertion,
Vice President Agnew was not actually indicted or convicted while in office. As part of a plea bargain,
Agnew resigned the Vice Presidency immediately before appearing in federal court to offer a plea of
nolo contendere to a single charge of tax evasion. KYVIG, supra note 1, at 136 – 137.
5. See generally RICHARD M. COHEN & JULES WITCOVER, A HEARTBEAT AWAY: THE
INVESTIGATION AND RESIGNATION OF VICE PRESIDENT SPIRO T. AGNEW 342 – 350 (1974).
6. KYVIG, supra note 1, at 132 – 137.
7. Akhil Reed Amar & Brian C. Kalt, The Presidential Privilege Against Prosecution, 2
NEXUS J. OP. 11, n. 1 (1997), citing 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES § 1563 (BOSTON, HILLARD, GARY & CO. 1833)
There are . . . incidental powers, belonging to the executive department, which are necessarily implied from the nature of the functions which are confided to it. Among these, must
necessarily be included the power to perform them, without any obstruction or impediment
whatsoever. The President cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office . . . .
8. James D. Myers, Bringing the Vice President Into the Fold: Executive Immunity and the
Vice Presidency, 50 B.C. L. REV. 897, 924-25 (2009).
9. Id. at 926., citing Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of
Legal Couns., on A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution 1 (Oct.
https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/sitting-president%E2%80%99s-amenability16,
2000),
indictment-and-criminal-prosecution [https://perma.cc/69XW-8VU4].
10. Id.
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II. BACKGROUND: THE AGNEW PRECEDENT
Spiro T. Agnew served as Vice President of the United States from
1969 to 1973. 11 Shortly after his re-election in 1972, Agnew came under
suspicion of having accepted bribes while serving as governor of
Maryland and as Vice President. 12 When the Justice Department referred
Agnew’s case to a federal grand jury for investigation, Agnew—through
counsel—moved the District Court to enjoin the grand jury from
considering the case on the grounds that as Vice President, he had absolute
constitutional immunity from indictment and criminal prosecution and
that his case could only be handled through an impeachment inquiry. 13 In
fact, Agnew even went so far as to ask the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to undertake impeachment proceedings. 14
In support of his position that his case could only be resolved through
impeachment, Agnew cited the 1826 case of Vice President John C.
Calhoun. 15 While serving as Vice President, Calhoun was accused of
profiteering from army contracts while previously serving as Secretary of
War. 16 Rather than being referred to a grand jury for investigation, his
case was instead sent to the House of Representatives for an impeachment
inquiry. 17 After a six-week House investigation, Calhoun was
exonerated. 18 This “Calhoun precedent” was reaffirmed in the 1873 case
of Vice President Schuyler Colfax, who was also accused of accepting
bribes prior to his Vice Presidency. 19 Like Calhoun, Colfax’s case was
referred to the House, not the Justice Department.20 After a House
11. JULES WITCOVER, THE AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY: FROM IRRELEVANCE TO POWER,
391– 406 (2014).
12. A HEARTBEAT AWAY, supra note 5, at 3–16. Though the U.S. Attorney’s investigation of
Agnew focused on kickbacks he allegedly accepted for steering government contracts to certain
contractors, Agnew ultimately pleaded nolo contendere to just a single charge of tax evasion as part
of a plea bargain.
13. Memorandum in Support of Motion, In re Proceedings of the Grand Jury Impaneled Dec.
5, 1972, No. 73-965 (D. Md. Oct. 5, 1973) [hereinafter Agnew Memo], available at 27 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 728, 750-53 (1999).
14. SPIRO T. AGNEW, GO QUIETLY . . . OR ELSE, 163–172 (1980). While seeking one’s own
impeachment may at first seem like a bizarre step, Agnew’s action was obviously one of selfpreservation. He calculated that even if he were to be impeached by the Democratically-controlled
House, he was unlikely to be removed by the Senate, where the Democrats’ numbers were short of
the two-thirds supermajority required for removal. JULES WITCOVER, VERY STRANGE BEDFELLOWS:
THE SHORT AND UNHAPPY MARRIAGE OF RICHARD NIXON AND SPIRO AGNEW, 316 (2007).
15. AGNEW, supra note 14, at 163–172.
16. THE AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY, supra note 11, at 70.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 172–173.
20. Id.
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impeachment inquiry, articles of impeachment were sent to the House
floor, where they were voted down. 21
Opposing Agnew’s motion on behalf of the Justice Department,
Solicitor General Robert Bork argued that an incumbent Vice President is
not constitutionally immune from grand jury investigation, subsequent
indictment, or even criminal prosecution while in office. 22 In so arguing,
Bork cited, inter alia, the 1804 case of Vice President Aaron Burr. 23
Despite having been indicted for murder, Burr’s case was never subjected
to a House impeachment inquiry and he actually served out the remainder
of his entire term as Vice President. 24 Bork reasoned that if Burr could
perform his constitutional duties while under indictment, Agnew could
too.
Ultimately, Vice President Agnew pleaded nolo contendere to a
single charge of tax evasion and resigned the Vice Presidency before the
District Court judge could rule on the motion at the center of the debate. 25
However, Agnew’s request that the Speaker of the House initiate an
impeachment inquiry was denied 26 and, as recently as 2000, the Justice
Department reaffirmed its position that sitting Vice Presidents are not
constitutionally immune from indictment and criminal prosecution. 27 This
is the Agnew precedent.
II. THE DEBATE OVER VICE PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY IN THE AGNEW
CASE
In order to understand the Agnew precedent, especially as part of a
modern reconsideration of it, one must first understand the arguments
presented in the Agnew case, both for and against absolute Vice
Presidential immunity. First, Vice President Agnew cited provisions in the
constitutional text, which he averred directly supported his conclusion that

21. Id. Colfax’s status as a “lame-duck” at the time of the impeachment inquiry was considered
crucial to the failure of the articles of impeachment.
22. Memorandum for the United States Concerning the Vice President’s Claim of
Constitutional Immunity, In re Proceedings of the Grand Jury Impaneled Dec. 5, 1972 (D. Md. Oct.
5, 1973) [hereinafter Bork Memo] (available at Memorandum: Watergate Special Prosecution Force,
27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 728, 795-96 (1999)).
23. Id. at 765.
24. THE AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY, supra note 11, at 39–40.
25. KYVIG, supra note 1, at 136–137.
26. Id. at 135.
27. Myers, supra note 8, at 926, citing Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Assistant Att’y
Gen., Off. Of Legal Couns., on A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal
Prosecution (Oct. 16, 2000), https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/sitting-president%E2%80%99samenability-indictment-and-criminal-prosecution [https://perma.cc/69XW-8VU4].
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sitting Vice Presidents are entitled to absolute constitutional immunity.
Second, Agnew also argued that the Vice Presidency is so significant in
the overall constitutional scheme that its occupant should be afforded
absolute constitutional immunity from indictment and criminal
prosecution in the same manner that the President is. Writing for the
Justice Department, General Bork rebutted both of these lines of
reasoning. This section reviews each side of the debate, in turn.
A.

Textual Bases for Vice Presidential Immunity

The two provisions from the constitutional text cited by Vice
President Agnew as directly supporting his conclusion that Vice
Presidents have absolute constitutional immunity are: Article I, Section 3,
Clause 7 and Article II, Section 4.
1. Article I, Section 3, Clause 7
Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 provides that, “in Cases of
Impeachment . . . the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and
subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to
law.” 28 In citing this provision, Agnew emphasized the word “convicted”
and argued that the usage of the past participle indicated that the Framers
did not intend to permit criminal proceedings against a constitutional
officer until after impeachment by the House and conviction by the
Senate. 29
Bork disputed this contention on the grounds that the clause only
applies to the President. His position was rooted in the fact that the
Framers’ debates regarding impeachment were exclusively related to the
President. 30 Therefore, he claimed, the clause did not apply to Vice
Presidents and other constitutional officers. As for the Constitution’s
specific reference to impeachment for the Vice President and other “civil
officers,” Bork asserted that this serves only to head off pleas of double
jeopardy for officers who are criminally tried after their impeachment.31
Furthermore, Bork pointed out, the Constitution does address
constitutional immunity for officers other than the President in Article 1,
Section 6. According to that clause,
Senators and Representatives are “privileged from Arrest during
their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to
28.
29.
30.
31.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
See Agnew Memo, supra note 13, at 754.
See Bork Memo, supra note 22, at 780.
Id. at 781.
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and returning from the same.” 32 Therefore, Bork reasoned, “no immunity
exists where none is mentioned.” 33 In other words, if the Framers had
intended to provide immunity to the Vice President, they would have
expressly done so as they did in Article 1, Section 6.
2. Article II, Section 4
Article II, Section 4, the “Impeachment Clause,” sets forth that “The
President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States, shall
be removed from Office on Impeachment for and Conviction of . . . high
Crimes and Misdemeanors.” 34 To be given its fair meaning, Agnew
argued, this clause must be read as being both an authorization and a
prohibition. 35 Accordingly, Agnew concluded that because the
Constitution “sanctions removal by an impeachment proceeding, and not
otherwise,” a Vice President’s election cannot be “set at naught by
criminal proceeding or other means of effective removal.” 36
While Bork conceded Agnew’s point that impeachment is the only
means for actual removal from office, he took issue with Agnew’s claim
that criminal indictment and prosecution amounted to effective or
“practical removal.” 37 Bork found this claim to be “without foundation in
history or logic.” 38 Historically, Bork noted, Vice President Aaron Burr
was indicted for murder, yet successfully exercised his constitutional
responsibilities until the end of his term. 39 Logically, Bork claimed, the
“criminal indictment, trial, and even conviction of a Vice President would
not, ipso facto, cause his removal” from office because such a Vice
President could always retain his seat. 40 Such a scenario was not out of
the realm of possibility, Bork reasoned, because first, Congress would
have the prerogative to choose not to impeach him and second, because
the President would have the power to pardon him. 41
In addition to these arguments over specific textual provisions of the
Constitution, the litigants in the Agnew case also engaged in a debate over
whether the significance of the office of the Vice Presidency in the

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
See Bork Memo, supra note 22, at 779.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
See Agnew Memo, supra note 13, at 755.
Id. (emphasis added).
See Agnew Memo at 785.
Id.
Id. at 786. Bork made no mention of the Calhoun or Colfax cases.
Id.
Id. at 787.
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constitutional scheme warranted absolute constitutional immunity for its
occupant.
B.

Significance of the Vice Presidency in the Constitutional Scheme

In arguing for absolute Vice Presidential immunity based on the Vice
Presidency’s overall significance in the constitutional scheme, Agnew
emphasized three broad themes: the office’s core constitutional functions,
the democratically-elected nature of the office, and the office’s status as
heir apparent to the Presidency.
1. The Core Constitutional Functions of the Vice President
Agnew argued that the Vice President’s core constitutional
functions 42 of standing ever-ready to serve as President, 43 presiding over
the Senate (and breaking ties therein),44 and monitoring the ability of the
President to discharge the powers and duties of his office, 45 rendered the
office so important to the country that the Vice President needed absolute
constitutional immunity. Of particular importance, according to Agnew,
was the Vice President’s function under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment of
determining whether the President needs to be removed from office due
to his inability to discharge the duties and responsibilities of that office.
Such a “heavy duty,” Agnew averred, is “far too important to the Nation
to permit [the Vice President’s] disablement by criminal prosecution.” 46
In response, Bork downplayed the significance of these functions on
the grounds that they either rarely occurred or would not actually be
impaired by the criminal process. 47 Moreover, Bork took particular issue
with Agnew’s assertions about the significance of the Vice Presidency
under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. The Vice Presidential duty to
declare Presidential disability, Bork countered, is not really as “heavy” as
Agnew claimed because, first, it is actually shared with the rest of the
Cabinet and, second, “it is not [even] an active, continuous executive
function” but merely “a single act” that could easily be performed by a
Vice President who was under indictment. 48 Furthermore, Bork insisted,

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See Agnew Memo, supra note 13, at 751-52.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3.
See Agnew Memo, supra note 13, at 765.
Id. at 793.
See Bork Memo, supra note 22, at 793.
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the asserted importance of the function was belied by the fact that such
power has never once been exercised in American history. 49
2. The Vice President as a Democratically Elected Official
Agnew also emphasized the democratic notion that the Vice
President’s “title traces to the vote of representatives of all citizens of the
Republic.” 50 Accordingly, he reasoned, the People should not be deprived
of a duly elected Vice President’s services by the mere whims of a
prosecutor and 12 grand jurors, but only “by [a] vote of equal dignity” 51
to the vote of the People. Therefore, he concluded, “a Vice President may
be removed from his office or effectively prevented from performing its
duties only through impeachment voted by the House, and judgment of
conviction voted by the Senate.” 52 Though Bork avowedly sought not to
“deprecate in any way the high office of the Vice Presidency or its
importance in the Constitutional scheme,” 53 he pointedly rejected
Agnew’s argument about the democratically-elected nature of the Vice
Presidency as an effort to “magnify the constitutional position” of an
officer who was not really directly elected by the People, but was actually
just “an understudy chosen by the presidential candidate.” 54
3. The Vice President as an Heir Apparent to the President
Finally, and most vigorously, Agnew argued that the Vice President
is “second only to the President in personifying the national will and
dignity.” 55 Noting the long accepted position that Presidents have absolute
constitutional immunity, Agnew drew parallels between the Presidency
and the Vice Presidency by citing the Twelfth Amendment. 56
Emphasizing that the Twelfth Amendment provides for the “simultaneous
and separate election of President and Vice President,” while also
requiring that the Vice President meet the same constitutional eligibility
requirements as the President—Agnew reasoned that the Vice President
should be as protected by absolute constitutional immunity from
indictment and criminal prosecution as the President is. 57 Rebutting this
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
See Agnew Memo, supra note 13, at 751.
Id. at 752.
Id. (emphasis added).
Bork Memo, supra note 22, at 796.
See Bork Memo at 788.
See Agnew Memo, supra note 13, at 751.
See Agnew Memo at 758.
Id.
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argument, Bork countered that the true thrust of the Twelfth Amendment
had little to do with the Vice Presidency whatsoever and really sought
only to revise the presidential election process. 58
Additionally, Bork argued that a constitutional officer should only
have absolute immunity if “subjecting him to the criminal process would
substantially impair the functioning of a branch of government.” 59 In
support of this position, Bork again referenced the example of the
Presidency. Noting that the President is of “singular importance” to the
Nation because the “whole executive power” is vested in him, 60 Bork
reasoned that the functions of the President are “inconsistent with his
subjection to the criminal process” precisely because he is so
“indispensable to the operation of government.” 61
By contrast, Bork argued that there is absolutely “no comparison
between the importance of the Presidency and the Vice Presidency.” 62
Again refuting the significance of the Vice President’s core constitutional
functions emphasized by Agnew, Bork argued that the
Vice Presidency is “clearly less crucial to the operations of the executive
branch.” 63 Bork further asserted that, unlike the Presidency, the Vice
Presidency is in no way “indispensable to the orderly operation of
government.” 64 Therefore, Bork concluded, “Congress and the judiciary
possess concurrent jurisdiction over allegations made concerning a Vice
President.” 65
While the arguments detailed above are thoughtful and wellreasoned, the cases presented on both sides of the debate have their flaws.
Indeed, the entire constitutional basis underlying the Agnew precedent
itself remains, as one historian has put it, “far from unassailable.”66 In
light of this, and with recent developments suggesting the possibility of
yet another Vice Presidential prosecution, 67 the question of Vice
Presidential immunity has once again become a “grave and unresolved”68
constitutional matter warranting further review. The following section

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Bork Memo, supra note 22, at 788.
Id. at 789.
Id. at 791-92.
Id. at 794.
Id. at 792.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 776.
KYVIG, supra note 1, at 136.
See supra notes 2-4.
Bork Memo, supra note 22, at 755.
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takes a fresh look at the Agnew precedent and the rationale underlying it
and offers new arguments to the debate over Vice Presidential immunity.
III. A FRESH LOOK AT THE AGNEW PRECEDENT
A

Critique of the Bork Memorandum

The Bork memorandum presented on behalf of the Justice
Department in support of its case against vice presidential immunity relied
on a blend of textualism and broader constitutional theory. It did so with
mixed effectiveness.
Consider Bork’s argument that “no immunity exists where none is
mentioned.” 69 Bork argued that because Article 1, Section 6 expressly
provides constitutional immunity only to Senators and Representatives,
Vice Presidents therefore have none. Not only does this expressio unis
rationale run afoul of Bork’s own separate argument that Presidents have
(extratextual) constitutional immunity, 70 but such a strict, bare textualist
reading of the Constitution can result in absurdity when applied elsewhere
in the document. For example, it would actually permit a Vice President
to preside at his own impeachment trial! 71 Surely the Constitution does
not really permit this, 72 so Bork’s bare textualist argument—while
credible and reasonable—ultimately falls under a shadow of doubt and
needs to be taken with the proverbial grain of salt. 73
Similarly flawed is Bork’s argument that because the Framers’
Constitutional Convention debates regarding impeachment were
exclusively related to the President, Article I, Section 3, Clause 7’s use of

69. Id. at 779.
70. See Bork Memo, supra note 22, at 780.
71. Joel K. Goldstein, Can the Vice President Preside at His Own Impeachment Trial? A
Critique of Bare Textualism, 44 ST. LOUIS. L. J. 849, 853 (2000) citing Michael S. Paulsen, Someone
Should Have Told Spiro Agnew, 14 CONST. COMMENTARY 245 (1997).
72. Goldstein, supra note 71, at 865-66.
Fundamental structural principles preclude a Vice President from presiding over his own
impeachment trial . . . such a practice would offend ideas intrinsic to the notion of the rule
of law, one of the fundamental concepts of our Constitution . . . . The Constitution imposes
few checks on the Vice President (perhaps because it gives him little power); one such
check is the prospect of impeachment. It would be anomalous if the Constitution allowed
him to preside over his own trial.
73. Agnew makes similar argumentative errors when asserting that the bare text’s use of the
past participle “convicted” in art. I, § 3, cl. 7 shows that the Framers did not intend to permit criminal
proceedings against a constitutional officer until after impeachment. This is also the case when
Agnew argues that art. II, § 4, in permitting the impeachment of a Vice President, prohibits other
action against him. See Part II.
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the past participle “convicted” must apply only to the President. 74 In fact,
that the Vice Presidency received such little attention at the Constitutional
Convention, 75 actually makes it less likely that the Framers intentionally
excluded it from the purview of that clause.
As for Bork’s arguments regarding Article II, Section 4, they too are
flawed. While Bork is correct that indictment and prosecution would not,
ipso facto, cause a Vice President’s removal from office, he gave too short
shrift to Agnew’s reasonable claim that indictment and prosecution
amounts to “effective removal.”
First, Bork cited the 1804 case of Aaron Burr in support of his
position that a Vice President under indictment can nevertheless perform
his constitutional duties. In so doing, Bork not only blatantly ignored the
more recent and then-prevailing precedents of Vice Presidents Calhoun
and Colfax, but he also failed to recognize the significant expansion of the
importance of the office of the Vice Presidency between 1804 and 1973. 76
Second, and more importantly, Bork ignored the fact that indictment
and prosecution of a sitting Vice President would delegitimize him in the
eyes of the Nation. While such delegitimization may matter little to an
indicted Vice President with few day-to-day constitutional duties, it would
matter tremendously to the Nation should the Presidency suddenly
devolve upon that very same Vice President. This would be particularly
problematic in the case of a Vice President who retained his office after a
criminal conviction. Bork expressly—and wrongly—assumed that a
convicted Vice President would be promptly removed through
impeachment. 77 This is not, however, necessarily true. As Bork himself
noted, Congress may very well choose not to impeach a Vice President
even if he was convicted in a criminal court. 78 Furthermore, history has
since shown that something like this is possible. Since the Agnew case,
two federal judges—Harry Claiborne and Walter Nixon—actually refused
to resign their offices while they underwent impeachment proceedings,
even after their convictions in federal court. 79
A Vice President continuing to serve while indicted or—worse yet—
convicted, would be disastrous for the country. Vice President Agnew
argued that the country would have been in “sore straits” had Vice

74.
75.
76.
(2005).
77.
78.
79.

See Bork Memo, supra note 22, at 780.
Goldstein, supra note 71, at 867.
See generally Richard Albert, The Evolving Vice Presidency, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 811, 812
See Bork Memo, supra note 22, at 793.
See Bork Memo, supra note 22, at 787.
KYVIG, supra note 1, at 281.

220

CONLAWNOW

[9:209

President Lyndon B. Johnson been under indictment on the day President
Kennedy was assassinated. 80 This is a reasonable observation, but even
more importantly, this author would posit that this country would have
been in even sorer straights had Agnew been convicted and still in office
on the day President Nixon resigned. This is all the more reason to require
absolute Vice Presidential immunity.
Finally, with regard to General Bork’s arguments regarding the
constitutional significance of the Vice Presidency, this author concedes
that they are generally accurate. This is especially apparent when reading
the Bork memo alongside the one filed in support of Agnew’s position,
which seems almost tortured in its efforts to aggrandize the office. Where
Bork (and, for that matter, Agnew too) missed the point though, was that
he only focused on what the Constitution tells us about the significance of
the Vice Presidency in and of itself. Bork patently overlooked what the
Constitution tells us about the Vice Presidency in the context of the entire
presidential administration.
B.

A New Argument: The Vice Presidency as a Constitutional Check
on the Legislative Impeachment Power

The Constitution makes clear that the Vice Presidency is part of a
democratically elected political partnership with the President. As part of
that partnership, the Vice Presidency serves the important constitutional
function of preventing the legislature from “reversing an election” 81
through the impeachment and removal of just one official. Put differently,
the Vice Presidency serves to preserve the administration elected by the
People even if the President is removed. This constitutional principle is
evidenced, not by the writings of the original Framers or by their
discussions at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 but, as indicated
below, through the amendments made to the Constitution throughout the
course of American history.
Prior to the ratification of the Twelfth Amendment in 1804, the
runner-up in the presidential election became Vice President.82
Accordingly, in early American history, the Vice President was actually a
political rival of the President. 83 With the advent of political parties
though, electors began “strategically” casting their ballots to ensure that
their preferred candidates would win both the Presidency and the Vice
80.
81.
82.
83.

Agnew Memo, supra note 13, at 767.
VERY STRANGE BEDFELLOWS, supra note 14, at 297–298.
Albert, supra note 76, at 840.
Id. at 830.
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Presidency. 84 When this awkwardly resulted in a tie for the Presidency in
the election of 1800, Congress and the States quickly rectified the problem
by ratifying the Twelfth Amendment—creating separate ballots for
President and Vice President, and thereby constitutionalizing the party
practice of creating a political team within the executive branch.85
While obviously serving to repair the defective constitutional
mechanism that led to the election of 1800 debacle, 86 this design also
served to prevent a change in party control of the executive branch in the
event of a presidential vacancy. In other words, the Vice Presidency, as
part of a democratically elected political team, now serves to uphold the
democratic will of the people if the President is removed or is otherwise
unable to serve. This principle, first seen in the Twelfth Amendment, was
underscored by later amendments to the Constitution, which further
established the Vice Presidency as part of a political partnership and a
stabilizing check on the legislature.
First, it was underscored in section 3 of the Twentieth Amendment, 87
ratified in 1933. This clause sets forth that the Vice President-elect shall
become President-elect if the President-elect dies before Inauguration
Day. In addressing the matter, the Framers of the amendment had the
opportunity of arranging another option (for example, a special election)
but instead, they chose to fall back on the democratic will of the People
by simply elevating the member of the team that had already been chosen.
Second, it was further underscored in section 1 of the TwentySecond Amendment, 88 ratified in 1951, though one has to look closely.
This clause is widely known as the constitutional provision that limits a
President to two terms, but it is relevant to the matter at hand because it
also provides that “no person who has held the office of President, or acted
as President for more than two years of a term to which some other person
was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President more
than once.” 89 This provision clearly contemplates the possibility of vice
presidential succession to the presidency, 90 again underscoring the
84. Id. at 839.
85. Id. at 840–842.
86. Id. at 837–838.
87. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1.
89. Id.
90. The original Framers evidently did not intend for the Vice President to become President
upon death, resignation or removal, but only to act as President. Goldstein, supra note 71, at 868.
This approach was quickly discarded. In 1841, in the wake of the first death of an incumbent
President, Vice President John Tyler unabashedly took the oath of office and assumed the Presidency
for himself, arguing that “the office” of the Presidency, not merely the “powers and duties” of the
Presidency had devolved upon him. By 1951, this “Tyler Precedent” had been followed by 6 other
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principle that when voters go to the ballot box, they vote not just for a
President, but for an administration.
Finally, the principle of the Vice President being part of a
democratically elected political partnership is most clearly seen in the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 91 ratified in 1967. Section 1 of this amendment
provides that “[i]n the case of the removal of the President from office, or
of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.” In
absolutely unambiguous terms the Twenty-Fifth Amendment reaffirms
the democratic principles, which first emanated from the Twelfth
Amendment, that the President and the Vice President together represent
an entire administration—a political partnership—elected by the People,
which is to be preserved for the duration of the elected term. This is further
evidenced by section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which sets forth
that in the event of a Vice Presidential vacancy, the President shall
nominate a replacement subject to confirmation by a majority of both
Houses of Congress. In so doing, the amendment preserves the elected
administration by averting the possibility of a shift of party control of the
executive branch in the event that the President dies or otherwise leaves
office during a period of a Vice Presidential vacancy. Again, the Framers
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment could have handled these matters
through the establishment of protocols for a special election or some other
framework, but they chose not to.
Read together, the Twelfth, Twentieth, Twenty-Second, and TwentyFifth Amendments reveal that the Vice Presidency not only upholds the
democratic will of the people, but also serves the “democratic principle
that a transfer of executive authority should proceed in a predetermined
orderly fashion.” 92 Furthermore, they show that the Vice Presidency
“promotes stability in the affairs of the state insofar as it defuses the
possibility that the Presidency will swing from one political party to
another as a successor moves into the office.” 93 This is squarely in line
with the rest of the constitutional framework, which was designed to
ensure a reliable, balanced, and stable government.
Altogether then, the democratic principles in the Constitution show
that the Vice Presidency effectively serves as a constitutional check on the
Vice Presidents: Millard Fillmore, Andrew Johnson, Chester Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt, Calvin
Coolidge, and Harry Truman. Albert, supra note 76, at 849.
91. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
92. Albert, supra note 76, at 862.
93. Id. (“This had been possible prior to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. When the Vice
Presidency was vacant, a presidential death or incapacity would thrust the Speaker of the House into
the Presidency, and there was of course no assurance that the Speaker and the President shared the
same party allegiance.”).
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legislative impeachment power by stabilizing the executive branch and
preserving the elected administration in the event the President is
removed. This is relevant to the matter at hand because it strongly suggests
that the indictment and prosecution of a sitting a Vice President actually
would, in the words of General Bork, “substantially impair the functioning
of a branch of government.” 94 This is especially critical today because
American constitutional culture is currently in the midst of what one
historian has called the “Age of Impeachment.” 95
For most of U.S. history, impeachment was rarely employed, much
less even mentioned. 96 In modern times though, impeachment has become
“commonplace [] in American thought, language and culture” as a
“weapon in political arsenals.” 97It has evolved from being the rarely used
nuclear weapon of American politics to a conventional weapon in political
combat to the point where it is now just considered a normal challenge of
national political life. 98
This has become glaringly true during the current controversial
presidency of Republican Donald Trump, whose political opponents,
calling for the normalization of impeachment,99 have already introduced
articles of impeachment against him. 100 If Trump were to be removed, the
presidency would then devolve upon Vice President Mike Pence. To
opponents of the administration though, Republican Pence is not a better
alternative 101 and this has led to calls for the dual impeachment of Trump
and Pence. 102 With Democrats likely to recapture the House of
Representatives in the 2018 midterm elections,103 thus placing a Democrat

94. Bork Memo, supra note 22, at 789.
95. See generally KYVIG, supra note 1.
96. Id. at 9.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1-7.
99. Ezra Klein, The Case for Normalizing Impeachment, VOX (Dec. 6, 2017),
https://www.vox.com/2017/11/30/16517022/impeachment-donald-trump [https://perma.cc/66H79KCL].
100. Kyle Cheney, Trump Impeachment Vote Fails Overwhelmingly, POLITICO (Dec. 6, 2017),
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/06/trump-impeachment-vote-fail-282888
[https://perma.cc/66XL-CHHE].
101. Jim Geraghty, The Tired ‘but Pence Might Be Worse’ Argument, NATIONAL REVIEW (Oct.
http://www.nationalreview.com/morning-jolt/452697/mike-pence-donald-trump16,
2017),
impeachment-argument [https://perma.cc/7VVP-6TF3].
102. Joe Concha, Maxine Waters: Pence Should Be Impeached After Trump, THE HILL (Aug. 4,
2017),
http://thehill.com/media/345358-maxine-waters-pence-should-be-impeached-after-trump
[https://perma.cc/H6F6-BX5T].
103. Nate Silver, Fundamentals Favor Democrats in 2018, FIVE THIRTY EIGHT (Nov. 8, 2017),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-fundamentals-favor-democrats-in-2018/
[https://perma.cc/Q2E4-JM9C].
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next-in-line of succession to the presidency, 104 such calls can only be
expected to increase.
While the idea of such “wholesale overthrow of an administration” 105
may initially seem far-fetched, 106 it is less difficult to imagine a scenario
in which, unable to acquire the bipartisan votes almost certainly required
for dual impeachment, the administration’s political opponents instead
attempt to force the Vice President from office through an indictment.107
In fact, the Agnew case shows how a Vice President can be delegitimized
and forced from the line of succession through prosecution. Furthermore,
this scenario is even more realistic given the recent emergence of the
“criminalization of political differences” whereby “overly malleable
laws” are used to prosecute the “questionable, but not necessarily
criminal, activities of political rivals.” 108
As discussed above, the democratic principles found within the
Constitution—namely the amendments establishing the Vice President as
part of a democratically elected political team—do not tolerate the forced
or “de facto removal 109“ of the Vice President from office. As part of an
elected administration, the Vice Presidency serves as a check on the
legislative impeachment power by preventing a change in party control of
104. The Speaker of the House of Representatives is next in the line of succession behind the
Vice President. 3 U.S.C. § 19 (“Presidential Succession Act of 1947”).
105. KYVIG, supra note 1, at 400.
106. Dual impeachment for the purposes of installing an opposition party Speaker has been
suggested at other times in recent American history. See Matthew Yglesias, The Impeachment Option,
THE ATLANTIC (July 7, 2007), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2007/07/theimpeachment-option/43076/ [https://perma.cc/7QKW-RPK8]. See also VERY STRANGE
BEDFELLOWS, supra note 14, at 297.
107. One might argue that the author’s concern is misplaced given that a Congress that could
remove a President could likely also remove his Vice President. This argument, however, overlooks
the fact that the 67-vote threshold required for removal in the Senate would almost certainly be a
bipartisan action. This author finds the likelihood of bipartisan action to overthrow an entire
administration to be extremely low. One might also argue that such a coup cannot happen because
once the Vice Presidency is vacated, the President appoints, under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, a
successor subject to confirmation by a majority of both Houses of Congress. This point overlooks,
however, that there is no guarantee that an appointee would actually be given a confirmation hearing.
This would be especially true if the President were then under consideration for an impeachment
proceeding. Such politicization of the confirmation process was most recently seen in the case of
Judge Merrick Garland. When President Obama appointed him to the Supreme Court, Senate
Republicans refused to hold confirmation hearings until after the next election. See Michael D.
Ramsey, Why the Senate Doesn’t Have to Act on Merrick Garland’s Nomination, THE ATLANTIC
(May 15, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/senate-obama-merrickgarland-supreme-court-nominee/482733/ [https://perma.cc/GCD5-QQ8E].
108. Alan M. Dershowitz, When Politics is Criminalized, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 28,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/28/opinion/politics-investigations-trump-russia.html
[https://perma.cc/3J7U-Q2G5].
109. Amar & Kalt, supra note 7, at 17.

2018]

VICE PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY

225

the executive branch in the event of a President’s removal. This is why
the Constitution requires absolute Vice Presidential immunity.
CONCLUSION
The historical record shows that the constitutional basis underlying
the Agnew precedent was weak. Largely, the precedent was just a product
of the exact moment in history in which it arose. With the then-brewing
Watergate scandal progressively making it more and more likely that
President Nixon would face his own impeachment, the Justice Department
was eager to do whatever was necessary to remove the embattled Agnew
from the line of succession so that a more palatable heir apparent could be
confirmed before Nixon’s own problems reached fever pitch. 110 In
essence, the Justice Department was trying to avert a crisis, hence, the
argument presented by Bork. With the increased criminalization of
politics in the “Age of Impeachment,” today’s officials are not likely to
be so reasonable and as such, absolute Vice Presidential immunity is
needed in the modern era. Even more importantly, though, absolute Vice
Presidential immunity is needed because the Constitution requires it.
While the Vice Presidency is significantly different from the
Presidency insofar as the constitutional functions its occupant performs,
the office is nevertheless equally “indispensable to the orderly operation
of government” and “crucial to the operations of the executive branch” 111
because of the democratic constitutional check it represents. In making
dual impeachment so constitutionally difficult, the Vice Presidency serves
as a check on the legislative impeachment power. Given this important
structural function, the Constitution requires that Vice Presidents have
absolute constitutional immunity. A Vice President should not be able to
be removed, or effectively removed, at the whims of a potentially
politically motivated prosecutor, 112 but only through the arduous twothirds supermajority U.S. Senate vote required by the Constitution. 113

110. KYVIG, supra note 1, at 137-138.
111. See Bork Memo, supra note 22, at 792.
112. Vice Presidential immunity would also serve the useful function of deterring politicallymotivated prosecutors from pursuing Vice Presidents on questionable charges in the first place.
113. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.

